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Abstract 
 
The article addresses the ontological presuppositions of the discourse on world politics in 
political and international relations theory. We argue that the ambivalent status of world 
politics is due to the understanding of its central concept, i.e. the world, in terms of totality or 
‘the whole’. Drawing on Alain Badiou’s set-theoretical ontology, the article demonstrates 
that such a concept is logically inconsistent, which leads the discourse on world politics to a 
perpetual oscillation between the presupposition of a universal totality and the unmasking of 
its impossibility. We then proceed to the particularistic concept of the world as a limited 
totality with no pretense to universality, as developed in Heidegger’s phenomenological 
ontology and Badiou’s objective phenomenology. While this approach that affirms the 
existence of the infinity of infinite worlds appears of little use to the universalist problematic 
of world politics, it provides us with a pathway to the third concept of the world as the void, 
in which a plurality of positive worlds coexist and which is their ontological condition of 
possibility. We shall argue that only this concept of the world enables a logically consistent 
notion of universality as non-totalizable and immediate. The final section addresses the 
implications of this concept for rethinking world politics as a practice of transformation of 
particular worlds in accordance with the universal principles derived from the disclosure of 
the world as void. 
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WHAT IS THE ‘WORLD’ IN WORLD POLITICS? HEIDEGGER, BADIOU AND VOID 
 
UNIVERSALISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Ambivalence of World Politics 
 
 
The contemporary discourse on world politics in political and international relations theory 
oscillates between the two extremes of unproblematic presupposition and skeptical denial. On 
the one hand, the studies of global governance, norms, regimes and institutions take as a point 
of departure the existence of a worldwide dimension of politics, which is then specified in 
various ways. According to this logic, which is at work in e.g. idealist, liberal and 
constructivist theories, the referent domain of world politics exceeds the state-centric realm of 
‘international relations’ and permits to incorporate into the discipline such formerly ignored 
problematics as gender, culture or identity as well as such formerly ignored actors as social 
movements, indigenous peoples and other minorities. In this manner, politics moves from the 
narrow confines of the international society of states to the widest possible, universal 
container of the world as a whole (see Lipschutz, 1992; Linklater, 1998; Wendt, 2003; Cerny, 
2010). On the other hand, realist approaches as well as critical orientations from neo-
Marxism to post-structuralism, maintain their skepticism about the very possibility of 
attaining such a universal dimension of politics or remain wary of the hegemonic aspirations 
at work in any attempt to practice politics on a ‘world’ level (Pin-Fat, 2009; Calhoun, 2002; 
Rasch, 2003; Odysseos and Petito, 2007; Mouffe, 2009). 
 
Despite their undeniable diversity, these approaches reproduce the ambivalent oscillation of 
the idea of world politics between a presupposition that is so self-evident as not to merit a 
conceptual explication and a problematic phantasm, only accessible to thought in the form of 
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a hegemonic pretension (cf. Walker, 2009: 20-28). We either do not need to know what world 
politics means, since it is ‘common knowledge’, or we cannot know it, since such knowledge 
is inaccessible, inconsistent or plain false. This constitutive ambivalence may be illustrated 
with the help of two recent influential monographs on this subject, Jens Bartelson’s Visions of 
World Community (2009) and RBJ Walker’s After the Globe, Before the World (2009). 
 
For Bartelson, the problematic status of the concept of the world community in the 
disciplinary discourse has to do with the differential logic of identity that has been 
constitutive of the discipline (Bartelson, 2009: 9-10). According to this logic, every identity 
is constituted by distinction from an ‘other’. Since a world community would lack such an 
other by definition, it is henceforth impossible other than as a hegemonic imposture that 
claims for itself the universality it can never attain (cf. Abizadeh, 2005; Prozorov, 2011). In 
his historical analysis Bartelson demonstrates that this logic of identity is a relatively recent 
invention and can therefore be overcome by a return to an earlier understanding of world 
community as a wider cosmological context, in which a plurality of human communities are 
always already embedded. This emphasis on embeddedness directs Bartelson’s attention to 
the cosmological visions, within which the ideas of world politics and world community have 
been articulated since the Middle Ages. These visions escape the differential logic of identity 
by ‘positing a larger social whole within which all human communities are embedded and 
well as a vantage point over and above the plurality of individual communities from which 
this larger social whole can be understood’ (ibid.: 20). Thus, it is possible to ‘restore the 
default settings of political thought’ (ibid.: 175) and reaffirm the world community no longer 
as an obscure telos of international politics, but as its very condition of possibility, something 
that is already here in the form of the presupposition, as long as human beings inhabit the 
same planet and share a common destiny. Yet, this reaffirmation ‘depends on its coherence 
and persuasiveness on the existence of a cosmological vantage point situated over and above 
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the plurality of human communities and the multitude of individual human beings.’ (Ibid.: 
 
181) 
 
 
In contrast to Bartelson’s optimistic vision, R.B.J. Walker’s After the Globe, Before the 
World exemplifies the tendency to render the universalist claims of world politics 
problematic. Walker addresses the ways in which numerous attempts to move from 
international relations to world politics remain caught up in what they try to transcend, i.e. 
the ontopolitical tradition of modernity, which is itself already an attempt at resolving the 
antinomies that we associate with world politics (e.g. universalism/particularism, 
nature/culture, individual/community, etc.) (Walker, 2009: 54-94). The ‘seduction’ and 
‘temptation’ of world politics belong to the very tradition of the ‘international’ as its inherent 
transgression, something simultaneously desired and held impossible (ibid.: 24, 83). 
 
Wherever we are, we are always ‘before’ the world, facing it as distant and inappropriable. 
Universalist claims are always ‘[enabled] within a particular array of boundaries, borders and 
limits’ and a ‘politics of the world’ that promises to do away with those remains ‘necessarily 
beyond reach’. (ibid.: 257-258) Thus, ‘anyone seeking to reimagine the possibilities of 
political life under contemporary conditions would be wise to resist ambitions expressed as a 
move from a politics of the international to a politics of the world, and to pay far greater 
attention to what goes on at the boundaries, borders and limits of a politics orchestrated 
within the international.’ (Ibid.: 2-3, see also 184-257) While there are numerous possibilities 
for political experimentation at these liminal sites, we would do well to remember that this 
experimentation always takes place on this side of the borderline. 
 
Thus, while Bartelson seeks to ‘deproblematize’ the question of world community, trying to 
rid it of logical paradoxes by enfolding the problematic of community into an explicitly 
cosmological context and thus making the world the a priori site of any community 
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whatsoever, Walker hypertrophies this question, making it practically impossible to exit the 
condition of the international at all. 
 
It is easy to see that this perpetual debate cannot be restricted to the domain of ‘IR theory 
proper’, since it pertains to the ontological presuppositions that condition the very distinction 
between the domestic and the international, and hence between political and IR theory.1 
Indeed, both Bartelson and Walker explicitly locate the question of world politics on the level 
of ontology, the universalist social ontology that precedes any possible ‘nationalization’ of 
community for Bartelson and the paradoxical yet resilient ontology grounding the 
international order for Walker. Since the argument of this article also remains on the 
ontological terrain, it is important to clearly define the concept of ontology that we shall rely 
on, all the more so because this concept is often deployed in diverse and somewhat confusing 
ways in political and IR theory. As Bruno Bosteels (2011: 241-242) has argued, the original 
Aristotelian sense of ontology as ‘first philosophy’, a science of being qua being frequently 
gives way to a rather more loose understanding of ontology in terms of ‘the basic 
presuppositions behind a given politico-philosophical stance, the bedrock of fundamental 
assumptions and unshakable commitments’, which might be better described as ‘political 
anthropology’ or even ‘ideology’. 
 
In order to avoid this reduction of ontology to a worldview, IR theorists have relied on the 
distinction between philosophical and scientific ontology (Patomaki and Wight, 2000: 215, 
Jackson, 2010: 29-31). While scientific ontology refers to a ‘catalog of objects, processes and 
factors that a given line of scientific research expects to exist or has evidence for the 
existence of’, philosophical ontology pertains to the question of our ‘hook-up to the world, 
how we as researchers are able to produce knowledge in the first place’ (Jackson, 2010: 28). 
While this distinction is helpful for highlighting the relation of substantive debates in IR 
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theory to the fundamentals of philosophy of science (Jackson, 2010: 29-40), it is clear that 
neither ‘philosophical’ nor ‘scientific’ ontology actually captures the Aristotelian sense of the 
discourse on ‘being qua being’ that deals with all that exists but only insofar as it exists. 
Evidently, ‘scientific ontology’ as described by Jackson pertains to individual and particular 
beings or realms thereof (e.g. states, states’ systems or statesmen) and not to being as such. In 
the terms of the two ontologists that we shall discuss in this article, Martin Heidegger and 
Alain Badiou, this approach would rather be termed ontical (Heidegger, 1962: 32-35) or 
phenomenological (Badiou, 2009a: 99-103). Yet, ‘philosophical ontology’ fares little better, 
insofar as in its investigation of our ‘hook-up’ to the world it supplants the question of being 
with the question of the knowledge of some beings by others, thereby slipping into the same 
ontical terrain, becoming indistinct from what we usually call ‘methodology’ (cf. Jackson, 
2010: 32). This is not to denigrate either of the enterprises but only to point out that prior to 
the study of particular worldly beings in their positive predicates and the study of the 
conditions of our access to these beings there exists a level of inquiry that addresses these 
objects solely in the aspect of their being, bracketed off from their particular predicates. It is 
this level, which we may term formal ontology (Hennig 2008), that the argument of this 
article occupies. 
 
While such an inquiry may appear excessively abstract, it does not imply a retreat into 
obscure and empty generality, since being, the object of ontology, is simultaneously the most 
universal and the most singular of all notions, accessible to us in the utmost facticity of our 
existence. ‘Being is most universal, encountered in every being, and is therefore most 
common; it has lost every distinction, or never possessed any. At the same time, being is the 
most singular, whose uniqueness cannot be attained by any being whatever.’ (Heidegger, 
1991: 192) As we shall argue below, it is precisely this ‘singular universality’ of being that 
conditions the possibility of a consistent concept of world politics. 
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In this article we shall draw on the insights from the phenomenological ontology of Martin 
Heidegger and the set-theoretical ontology of Alain Badiou in the discussion of three possible 
concepts of the world: the whole of beings (the world as ‘everything’), a limited totality of 
beings (the world as ‘something’) and the void of being (the world as ‘nothing’). We shall 
demonstrate that while the first concept is logically inconsistent and the second one 
inconsequential for the discourse on world politics, the third concept alone grounds a 
consistent form of universalism that rids the theory of world politics of its constitutive 
ambivalence. In the final section we shall address the possibility of a politics adequate to this 
universality. While the detailed analysis of this politics remains beyond the scope of this 
article, we merely seek to demonstrate the possibility of a universalist politics whose maxims 
are derived from our exposure to the world as void. 
 
 
 
 
The World as Everything 
 
 
Despite their diverging conclusions about the possibility of a world community, Bartelson 
and Walker converge in the basic assumption about the meaning of the ‘world’ in world 
politics. Bartelson’s world, which is already ‘behind’ us as an all-encompassing whole, 
within which we are embedded, and Walker’s world, which stands ‘before’ us as an 
unattainable universality, are one and the same world, understood in the sense of the Whole, a 
cosmos, universe or totality, in short, everything. This understanding of the world as the 
whole has arguably been at work in IR theory since its very emergence (see e.g. Morgenthau, 
1948, chapters 29, 30; Carr, 1981; Schmitt, 1976; Burton, 1972; Boulding, 1985), and seems 
so perfectly in accordance with common sense and everyday language that it is difficult to 
see what could possibly be wrong with it. 
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Let us posit the world as the whole, the sum of all beings. Such a totality must by definition 
count itself among its members, otherwise it would not be the sum of all beings, since it 
would remain outside itself. The world as the whole is thus endowed with a property of self-
belonging. It should therefore be possible to divide it into two parts: the parts of the world 
that belong to themselves, such as the world itself, and the parts that do not, such as e.g. a set 
of five apples which is not itself an apple. Let us then assemble the latter parts into a group of 
all parts that do not belong to themselves – a perfectly legitimate and even banal grouping, 
given that most multiplicities that we can think of are precisely not self-belonging. Yet, 
despite the banality of the predicate, this grouping turns out to be problematic as soon as we 
pose the question of whether it belongs to itself. If it does, it counts itself among its elements, 
which are defined by the property of not belonging to themselves. Yet, if it does not belong to 
itself, it must also count itself among its elements, which, after all, compose all the parts that 
do not belong to themselves. Whatever answer we choose, we end up with inconsistency, 
hence we must revise our original assumption and affirm that the world as the sum of all 
beings does not exist. 
 
It  is  easy  to  recognize  in  this  example  the  famous  Russell’s  paradox  which  has  been 
 
foundational for the formulation of axiomatic set theory in the early 20th century. Yet, is set-
theoretical logic relevant to the grand debates on world politics? In fact, as long as we 
conceive of ontology in the Aristotelian sense as the study of being qua being, set theory 
offers the best paradigm of such a discourse. In Alain Badiou’s famous argument, set theory 
is ontology pure and simple, since its object is not any particular class of beings defined by 
some positive predicates but rather everything that is insofar as it is: being as such is nothing 
but pure multiplicity that can be adequately grasped by set-theoretical axioms precisely 
insofar as they subtract being from the positive properties of beings (Badiou, 2005: 4-16). 
Sets are not a particular class of beings alongside others, e.g. human beings or social kinds, 
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but rather the mode of presentation of all beings solely in their being (ibid.: 23-30). 
Evidently, the argument that set theory is ontology does not mean that being is ‘composed of 
mathematical objectivities’ but only asserts that set theory ‘pronounces what is expressible of 
being qua being’ and is therefore the most adequate form of ontological discourse (ibid.: 8). 
 
From this perspective, the axioms of set theory necessarily pertain to everything that is, 
including the entities of the international domain and the world as the result of their 
totalization. To exclude these entities (be they states or persons, organizations or movements, 
etc.) from the field of application of set-theoretical axioms is simply to deprive them of being 
and reduce them to the status of simulacra, phenomenal apparitions without any ontological 
status. In short, as soon as we pose the problem of the world in ontological terms, the set-
theoretical argument on the inexistence of the whole appears not merely applicable to the 
discourse on world politics but of direct and paramount relevance to it. 
 
We shall therefore conclude that concept of the world, understood in terms of cosmos, 
universe or totality, is inconsistent: the Whole has no being (Badiou, 2005: 40-42; 2009a: 
109-111). We must emphasize that this claim does not merely concern the antiquated pre-
Galilean conceptions of the closed totality of the cosmic order, whose crisis was addressed by 
Alexandre Koyre (1957) in his seminal work From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. 
In fact, it is precisely because the world is infinite that it cannot be totalized into any figure of 
the whole, without violating Georg Cantor’s theorem, foundational for set theory (see 
Badiou, 2005: 142-160, 265-280). For any set whatsoever, it is possible to construct a set, 
whose elements are all the subsets of the original set, a so-called ‘power-set’. We may easily 
intuit that this set would be quantitatively greater than the original set: e.g. the number of 
possible combinations of any three letters a, b and c is eight (a, b, c, ab, bc, ac, abc and finally 
the void set Ø, which is included as a ‘universal part’ of any set and which we shall discuss in 
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detail below). Cantor’s theorem demonstrates that for infinite sets the size of the power-set is 
also greater than that of the original set, and, moreover, it is inaccessibly greater: it is possible 
to posit any infinite cardinal greater than that of the original set as the ‘size’ of its power-set 
(ibid.: 277-280). 
 
The consequences of this theorem for any cosmological conception of the world are 
staggering. As soon as we posit the existence of the world as the whole, it is possible to 
construct a power-set of this world, which will be immeasurably greater than it, leaving an 
excess that cannot be incorporated into it. The same procedure can then be applied to this 
power-set and so on to infinity. There is thus no such thing as ‘the absolutely infinite Infinity, 
the infinity of all intrinsically thinkable infinities’ (ibid.: 277. Cf. ibid.: 283-284). The world 
as the whole is never all there is. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the thesis on the inexistence of the Whole is an ontological 
claim about the world that should be rigorously distinguished from a rather more familiar and 
unobjectionable epistemological claim that our knowledge or representation of the world is 
never complete, while the world in itself might well be so, the claim that characterizes the 
post-Kantian position that Quentin Meillassoux termed ‘correlationism’ (Meillassoux, 2008: 
5). Insofar as we take the axioms of set theory to pertain to the being of all there is, the 
epistemological failure or incapacity to know the world as a whole is converted into the 
ontological feature of the world as itself non-whole or non-totalizable (cf. ibid.: 51-53). Thus, 
contrary to the correlationist skepticism that perpetually refers this non-totalizability back to 
us as subjects of knowledge, Badiou’s thesis on the inexistence of the whole affirms it as the 
feature of being itself, which, moreover, we may know perfectly well with no reason for any 
skepticism (Badiou, 2009a: 101-102). 
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The World as Something 
 
 
Having demonstrated that the world cannot be consistently posited as the whole, let us now 
consider the alternative possibility. The world may be posited as a limited totality with no 
pretense to universality, a something rather than everything. 
 
Indeed, such a non-cosmological, ‘local’ concept of the world was dominant in the 20th 
century phenomenology, particularly the early work of Martin Heidegger. In Being and Time 
Heidegger defined the world as a referential totality of Dasein’s ‘involvements’ with other 
beings, the environment in which Dasein is absorbed in all kinds of references or assignments 
that involve various kinds of ‘equipment’, entities that are ‘ready-to-hand’ (zuhanden) for 
one’s dealings in the world (Heidegger, 1962: 95-107). The detailed phenomenology of 
being-in-the-world in the First Division of Being and Time moves from the ontic 
understanding of the world as the totality of all the entities, i.e. the Whole we have dismissed 
as inconsistent, to ‘that wherein a factical Dasein as such can be said to live.’ (Ibid.: 93) This 
dwelling place is a practical context of Dasein’s involvements with entities which are 
disclosed to it, not in an objectified manner of things present-at-hand (vorhanden) but in 
terms of practical functions that can be assigned to them and for which they available. The 
paradigm of Heidegger’s phenomenology of the world is the workshop, a totality of tools 
assigned to certain practical functions, in which Dasein is involved (Harman, 2002: 15-48; 
Malpas, 2006: 182-189). Thus, the world is always already there for Dasein as the referential 
totality of its involvements and any discovery of a concrete entity in the world is only 
possible on the basis of our pre-understanding of the world, in which we dwell. 
 
Alain Badiou’s phenomenology, presented in his Logics of Worlds (2009a) offers a similar 
concept of the world as a limited totality. Nonetheless, in contrast to Heidegger, for whom the 
world is necessarily disclosed to Dasein, Badiou’s phenomenology is ‘objective’, neutralizing 
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any intentional or ‘lived’ dimension of the worlds he analyzes, making the existence of 
worlds entirely independent from human existence (Badiou, 2009a: 118-119). This accounts 
for a different relationship between ontology and phenomenology in Badiou’s work. For 
Heidegger ontology was itself necessarily phenomenological in its method, since its condition 
of possibility was Dasein’s pre-understanding of being, on whose basis the meaning of being 
is to be interpreted (Heidegger, 1962: 29-35, 49-63). In contrast, Badiou posits a rigorous 
disjunction between them while making both entirely independent of the existential analytic 
of Dasein (Badiou, 2009a: 118). While ontology deals with being in the set-theoretical sense 
of pure or inconsistent multiplicity, the phenomenology of Logics of Worlds focuses on the 
localization of being as ‘being-there’, appearance in a determinate and ordered situation. It is 
this situation, structured as a network of identities and differences, that Badiou terms the 
world. In more technical terms, the world is defined as a set that contains a transcendental 
and the transcendental indexing of all its elements (ibid.: 598). 
 
The transcendental refers to the order-structure that assigns the entities in the world various 
degrees of intensity of appearance. Contrary to the more familiar concept of the 
transcendental in Kant’s philosophy, Badiou’s transcendental organization of the world is a 
strictly immanent process that accounts for the logical cohesion of appearance, which is not 
determined by the ontological composition of the situation – a key point we shall return to 
below (ibid.: 101, 121-122, 241-242). Transcendental indexing is a function that makes a 
degree of appearance (from the minimum to the maximum) correspond to a pair of elements 
of the set that appears in the world. On the basis of these operations Badiou builds up an 
elaborate phenomenology, in which any situation whatsoever, from a protest demonstration 
to a country house on an autumn evening, can be analyzed as a world, structured by a 
particular transcendental order. 
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This conception of the world yields two important consequences. Firstly, on the basis of the 
principle of the inexistence of the whole, we may conclude that there is always more than 
one world (ibid.: 114-115). Moreover, since it is impossible to restrict the number of worlds 
in the absence of the whole, their number may therefore be posited as infinite. Secondly, 
every one of these worlds is itself infinite. It is impossible to delimit a world either from 
below through the dissemination of its elements or from above through their totalization 
(ibid.: 306-310, 331-335). 
 
Thus, we have moved from the assumption of one world as the Whole to the infinity of 
worlds that are themselves infinite. Each of those worlds is characterized by a specific 
transcendental order that can be reconstituted through a Heideggerian or Badiouan 
phenomenology, but is at the same time part of a wider world and decomposable into smaller 
worlds that are also liable to phenomenological analysis. While this approach can be 
fruitfully applied in IR in the study of e.g. the ‘worlds’ of diplomatic negotiations, border 
policing or refugee camps, it is apparently of little help in rethinking world politics in its 
more familiar universalist sense, since world politics here is simply the politics that unfolds 
within a particular world in accordance with its transcendental order. The very question of 
political universality appears to be foreclosed by the plurality of worlds with particular orders 
above or between which no authority exists. Is not world politics then strictly synonymous to 
international relations and the world simply identical to the international domain that it was 
intended to transcend? (Walker 2009: 21-22) This is indeed the position of the diverse group 
of the critics of cosmopolitan universalism who affirm the pluralism of the international as 
the sole possible universal (see e.g. Jackson 2003, Connolly 1995, Mouffe 2009), whereby 
the world is nothing but a plurality of worlds and world politics consists in maintaining this 
plurality against any hegemonic totalization. 
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Nonetheless, the universalization of the international as the ‘world of all worlds’ merely 
throws us back into logical inconsistency. Just as ontologically every set is a set of sets, so 
every world is in principle a world of worlds, i.e. it contains other worlds that appear in it 
(Badiou, 2005: 45; 2009: 112). It is therefore possible for the international world to contain 
an infinite multiplicity of worlds – the only thing that this or any other world cannot contain 
is everything. Thus, as Walker demonstrates admirably, one will never reach world politics if 
one begins from the international (Walker, 2009: 26-31). Yet, while this claim leads Walker 
to a profound skepticism about world politics as such, the impossibility of passing from the 
international to the world is only a problem as long as we continue to envision the 
universality of world politics as necessarily mediated by particularity (cf. Pin-Fat 2009). If 
the world of the international is a particular world among others and, as Walker argues at 
length, its particular transcendental is historically contingent, the impossibility of arriving at 
the universality of world politics from the particularism of the international simply entails the 
need for another starting point for conceptualizing the universality of world politics. Since 
presupposing the world as the whole leads us to inconsistency and starting from particular 
worlds leads us nowhere, this new starting point is obtained by abandoning every totalizing 
conception of the world and asserting its universality without recourse to any mediation by 
the particular. It is this solution that we address in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
The World as Nothing 
 
 
While at first glance the particularistic conception of worlds merely confirms the impasse of 
the discourse of world politics due to the inaccessibility of the universal, it actually guides us 
towards a solution to our problem by raising the question of the conditions of appearance of 
this infinity of worlds. Simply put, where are all these worlds? Just as we commonly speak of 
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all the species, books or mountains in the world, we may speak of the infinity of worlds 
existing ‘in the world’. But what is this world in which the infinity of positive, 
transcendentally regulated worlds comes to appearance? If this ‘world of all worlds’ were 
itself a positive world, it would have to be a self-belonging universal set, which we have 
dismissed as logically inconsistent. This world must therefore be a non-positive site, in which 
an infinity of positive worlds comes to appearance. Yet, what could this ‘in which’ possibly 
be? 
 
From ancient Greek atomism onwards, this problem has been resolved by asserting that 
whatever exists positively does so in the empty space, vacuum or void, in short – Nothing 
(see Gregory, 1981; Badiou, 2009b: 56-64). Indeed, this answer appears to be the last 
remaining logical possibility: if we have excluded the possibility of the world being 
everything and we are not satisfied with a particularistic understanding of the world as 
something, then it can only be nothing. Yet, everything depends on how we understand this 
‘nothing’. As long as it is understood in the merely negative sense of privation, lack or 
absence, we remain within the political ontology of the international for which there are only 
particular worlds and nothing beyond them. However, it is also possible to understand the 
claim about the nothingness of the world as a pure affirmation: there is a world, in which an 
infinity of infinite worlds appears, and this World, which we shall henceforth capitalize to 
distinguish it from worlds as limited totalities, is nothing but the void. 
 
Let us elucidate this concept of the World by revisiting Heidegger’s work after Being and Time, 
in which there is a gradual shift away from the understanding of the world as a  practical context 
of Dasein’s activity towards an ontological concept of the world (cf. Malpas, 2006: 186-189). In 
his 1929-1930 course of lectures The Fundamental Concepts on Metaphysics Heidegger argues 
that ‘[ordinary] understanding cannot see the world for beings. 
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In relation to the individual trees and the way they are gathered together the forest is 
something else. It is that out of which the many trees belong to a forest.’ (Heidegger, 1995: 
 
347) The World is thus neither a being nor an aggregation of all beings in a particular world 
but rather the opening, in which particular worlds become disclosed for the first time. This 
opening is not immediately manifest to the inhabitant of a particular world but can only 
disclose itself through the awakening of a ‘fundamental attunement’ or mood (Stimmung). In 
the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics this world-disclosing mood is described as 
profound boredom, which Heidegger analyzes in terms of two ‘structural moments’: being 
 
left empty and being held in limbo (ibid.: 82-88, 113-125, 136-143). 
 
 
The first moment refers to a state of indifference that envelops all the beings including 
Dasein itself. No possibility of action or use is available to Dasein which finds itself 
suspended in the midst of beings that ‘refuse themselves’ and have ‘nothing to offer’ to it. 
The second moment, being held in limbo, is closely related to this suspension. The beings 
that refuse themselves are nothing other than possibilities of Dasein’s existence that are left 
unexploited. However, this withdrawal of concrete possibilities ‘impels’ Dasein towards a 
more originary ‘making possible’, the sheer potentiality of existence from which specific 
possibilities arise (ibid.: 143-144). In the mood of profound boredom Dasein is 
simultaneously entranced by the emptiness of the total indifference of beings and impelled 
towards what Heidegger calls the ‘moment of vision’ (ibid.: 151-152, cf. Heidegger 1962, 
384-400), a resolute grasp of authentic existence, in which world disclosure takes place. 
 
Yet, what exactly is disclosed here? It is purely and simply nothing, the emptiness arising 
from beings refusing access to themselves and the void of Dasein’s existential possibilities. 
‘The openness at stake is essentially the openness to a closedness, and whoever looks in the 
open sees only a closing, only a not-seeing.’ (Agamben 2004: 68. See also Heidegger, 1973: 
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169-180) The opening of the World is nothing more than the result of the subtraction of the 
human being from its particular world. 
 
The metaphysical problem of the nothing is elaborated in Heidegger’s 1929 lecture ‘What is 
Metaphysics?’ In this lecture, Dasein is explicitly defined as ‘being held out into the nothing’ 
(Heidegger, 1973: 108) and this nothing is posited as the paradoxical ‘ground’, in which all 
beings come to appear: Ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit [from the nothing all beings as beings 
come to be] (ibid.). While traditionally metaphysics tended to approach nothing as the 
‘counter-concept of being’, its pure and simple opposite, Heidegger demonstrates the way, in 
which nothing, which is indeed not a being, nonetheless discloses the being of beings as 
such, i.e. the difference of all beings with respect to the nothing: ‘[The Nothing] discloses 
these beings in their full but heretofore concealed strangeness as what is radically other – 
with respect to the nothing. Only on the ground of the original revelation of the nothing can 
human existence approach and penetrate beings.’ (Ibid: 103. Cf. Harman, 2002: 90-95) Thus, 
while in a fundamental attunement such as boredom Dasein can rise above the ‘superficies of 
existence’ (ibid.: 104) and approach beings in their being, this ‘rise above’ does not take one 
to another place of the abundance of beings and the plenitude of possibilities, but rather 
entails the slipping away of these beings and possibilities, so that Dasein stands alone in the 
void of the World as the ‘lieutenant of the Nothing’ (ibid.: 106). 
 
The theme of the world as the void culminates in Heidegger’s 1947 Letter on Humanism, in 
which he reinterprets the human as a ‘worldly’ being. Against the contrast between ‘worldly’ 
and ‘spiritual’ in everyday language, Heidegger understands Dasein’s wordliness in terms of 
its transcendence of any particular being or realm of being (i.e. a positive world) through 
being ‘placed freely into the clearing of Being, which alone is ‘world’’: 
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[For] us ‘world’ does not at all signify beings or any realm of beings but the 
openness of Being. Man stands out into the openness of Being. ‘World’ is the 
clearing of Being into which man stands out on the basis of his thrown essence. 
World is in a certain sense precisely ‘the beyond’ within existence and for it. 
(ibid.: 252) 
 
Thus, Heidegger’s conception of the world moves from the phenomenology of the particular 
world as an immanent practical context of Dasein’s activity to the affirmation of the World as 
the void or clearing, in which such worlds are disclosed in the first place. The void is 
therefore the condition of possibility of any positive world whatsoever: it is that in which 
these worlds appear, but, in contrast to the two concepts of the world addressed above, it 
neither totalizes these worlds into the whole nor is mediated by them. Nonetheless, this 
approach poses the question of the relation between the World as void and the positive 
worlds, be these the worlds of diplomacy, development, migration or war. If these worlds 
simply come to appearance against the background of the void as ‘not nothing’, the World 
appears to be little more than a logical condition that can hardly ground any politics, reduced 
as it is to a neutral support of the infinite proliferation of positive worlds coexisting in the 
vacuum. In this manner, politics is ‘deontologized’ and reduced to the positive principles 
governing autonomous worlds, between which no adjudication is possible. Instead of 
universalism, we end up with nihilism and relativism, which in the context of the discussion 
of Heidegger take an even more ominous and historically concrete form of Nazism. 
 
While any serious consideration of the ‘Heidegger problem’ goes beyond the scope of this 
article, our reconstruction of the concept of Heidegger’s concept of the World as void at least 
permits us to offer a new perspective on it. Nihilism, to which Nazism was a historical 
response and of which it was the historical nadir, is not constituted by embracing the 
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ontology of the World as void, but rather by its negation. Nihilism is a disposition that wants 
to ‘know nothing of the nothing’, reducing it to a mere ‘nullity’ (Heidegger, 1977: 96). In 
Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger defined nihilism in terms of ‘chasing after beings’ in 
the ‘oblivion of being itself’, which we may rephrase in terms of the valorization of worlds in 
the oblivion of the World: 
 
But where is the real nihilism at work? Where one clings to current beings and 
believes it is enough to take beings, as before, just as the beings that they are. 
But with this, one rejects the question of being and treats being as a nothing 
(nihil), which in a certain way it even "is," insofar as it essentially unfolds. 
Merely to chase after beings in the midst of the oblivion of being - that is 
nihilism. (Heidegger, 1961: 217) 
 
If the void of the World is reduced to the neutral nothingness as the background for the 
appearance of positive worlds, no universality is conceivable, since the infinite plurality of 
positive orders is all there is. The formula of nihilism may thus be summed up as follows: 
‘there are only positive worlds and nothing besides them’. Yet, if this is the case, then there is 
no political principle that could transcend the positive order of the world and in terms of 
which this order could ever be found illegitimate: everything is permissible if a particular 
transcendental order permits it. In this manner, Nazism becomes possible as a world, in which 
the negativity of annihilation paradoxically reigns as the supreme ordering principle. 
 
Yet, it is important to bear in mind that it only becomes possible as a result of the negation of 
the World as void, its nullification as politically inconsequential and incapable of grounding 
any universalist politics. While Heidegger admittedly could not resist the temptation of this 
nullification himself, his thought at least permits us to trace this ontopolitical gesture in 
Western metaphysics, which is the first step in the direction of its overcoming. The second 
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step in this direction consists in elucidating the relation between the ontology of the World 
and the phenomenology of worlds, which will make the concept of the World as void 
politically consequential and thereby redeem its universalist potential. In the following 
section we shall pursue this question in an analysis of Alain Badiou’s ontology. 
 
 
 
 
The World and Worlds 
 
 
While Badiou restricts the term ‘world’ to the positive totalities regulated by a transcendental 
order, the void is the most important concept in his ontology and functions in the manner 
resonant with Heidegger’s clearing yet also radicalizing his ontological insight. Ironically, 
while in ‘What is Metaphysics?’ Heidegger famously accused mathematics and other exact 
sciences of being incapable of treating the nothing (ibid.: 94-95), Badiou’s use of the set-
theoretical category of the void set to ground ontology demonstrates precisely the kind of 
engagement with the nothing that Heidegger sought. More generally, although it could 
plausibly be argued that Heidegger and Badiou agree on almost nothing with regard to either 
philosophy or politics, what they actually do agree about is the Nothing itself, the ontological 
status of the void as the condition of possibility of positive worlds. 
 
In Logics of Worlds, Badiou departs from the void as the first determinable set. Since in a set-
theoretical ontology one can only posit a set if one can determine its composition, it is 
possible to immediately determine a set that has no elements, i.e. the void set Ø. The 
thinkability of all other sets depends on their belonging to specific worlds. Yet, since the void 
set has no elements, it logically appears in any world whatsoever: 
 
[Since] the void is the only immediate being, it follows that it figures in any 
world whatsoever. Without the void, there is no world, if by ‘world’ we 
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understand the closed place of an operation. Conversely, where something 
operates – that is, where there is world – the void can be attested. (Badiou, 
2009a: 114. Emphasis added.) 
 
While for Heidegger every particular world must be disclosed in the void, for Badiou it is the 
void itself that appears in every positive world. Moreover, in contrast to Heidegger, for 
Badiou the void is not merely the clearing of being but literally its building block, so that 
whatever appears in the world ultimately depends on the void for its being. To recall, what 
appears in Heidegger’s clearing, i.e. beings and worlds as ‘realms of beings’, is not itself 
composed of the clearing but is disclosed against the background of the Nothing as precisely 
not nothing. For Badiou beings are instead ‘woven out of the void’ (Badiou, 2005: 57. Cf. 
Badiou 2009a: 112-113). This does not mean that everything is in fact made of nothing, but 
merely that in order to be grasped in the aspect of their being, beings must be subtracted from 
all positive predicates they are endowed with in the particular worlds, just like Dasein is in 
the mood of profound boredom (Badiou, 2005: 58). For this reason, ontology is equivalent to 
a theory of the void and, moreover, can only be a theory of the void, since if it asserted the 
existence of other beings, it would reduce itself to phenomenology, i.e. the description of the 
transcendental orders of particular worlds. Ontology must therefore begin and end with the 
void, all of its terms being derived from the void alone (Badiou 2005, 57). 
 
[The] absolutely primary theme of ontology is therefore the void – the Greek 
atomists, Democritus and his successors, clearly understood this – but it is also 
its final theme because in the last resort, all inconsistency is unpresentable, thus 
void. If there are ‘atoms’, they are not, as the materialists of antiquity believed, 
a second principle of being, the one after the void, but compositions of the void 
 
 
 
21 
itself, ruled by the ideal laws of the multiple whose axiom system is laid out by 
ontology. Ontology, therefore, can only count the void as existent. (Ibid.: 58) 
 
All the beings of every world are, in their being, compositions of the void. With the help of 
the axioms of set theory, it is possible to generate an infinite number of sets from the void 
alone. Thus, the World as void is not merely the ‘nothing’ against whose background beings 
emerge but rather the ontological condition of possibility of all the beings, which appear in 
all positive worlds. Insofar as the void figures in any world whatsoever, it is a ‘universal part’ 
(ibid.: 86-88), underlying the constitution and structuration of every particular world. It is 
easy to see that the universality of this ‘part’ satisfies our criteria of immediacy and non-
totalizability: insofar as the World is nothing, it is the very opposite of the Whole, and insofar 
as it is the ground of all being, it is always already there, immediately, in any world 
whatsoever. Thus, the World is the universal that precedes and exceeds the constitution of 
anything particular, making possible the proliferation of the infinite number of worlds while 
proscribing their aggregation into the whole. 
 
While the World is in every world, it is important to emphasize that there is no necessary 
relation between the World as void and the positivity of worlds. If one could infer appearance 
from being, there would only be one positive world whose transcendental order would 
somehow ‘correspond’ to the void – that world would have to be the whole and is therefore 
impossible. It is nonetheless possible to make the opposite move of inferring being from 
appearance that would establish ‘an ontological halting point’ (Badiou, 2009a: 195) to the 
infinite proliferation of intra-worldly appearances. In Badiou’s postulate of materialism, 
‘every atom of appearance is real’ (ibid.: 218-220), so that whatever appears in the world 
must have an ontological correlate, a multiplicity composed of the void. 
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Thus, we end up with the tripartite scheme, in which the abyss between an infinity of positive 
worlds and the void of the World is bridged by the ontology of pure multiplicity: the void of 
being - beings composed of the void - beings ordered in worlds. What the World makes 
possible is not this or that world in particular but rather the proliferation of being as 
inconsistent multiplicity, which is then ordered in accordance with the transcendental of a 
given world. In other words, the World as void brings forth the ontological material for the 
construction of worlds that ensures that whatever appears is real without prescribing how it 
should appear. Thus, while whatever appears in the world is necessarily grounded in real 
being, the mode of its appearance, prescribed by the transcendental order of the world, is 
absolutely contingent, having no ontological correlate. 
 
 
 
 
Is There a Politics of the World? 
 
 
The elucidation of the relation between the World and worlds makes it possible to revisit the 
question of world politics. We have demonstrated that this politics cannot take the form of 
the totalization of all the beings into the world state or other figure of the whole. Nor does 
this politics consist in the infinite ascent towards universality through the mediation of 
particular worlds or their perpetual expansion. Yet, what kind of politics could possibly 
follow from the understanding of the World as the void, in and from which an infinite 
number of worlds emerges? 
 
The first conclusion to be drawn from the concept of the World as void consists in the 
affirmation of the contingency of every world, insofar the transcendental order that 
conditions its appearance has no foundation in being. The disclosure of the World within 
positive worlds demonstrates that every world is literally founded on nothing, disturbing its 
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transcendental order and opening it up to the possibility of transformation. Understood in this 
sense, a politics of the World consists in coming to terms with the radical contingency of the 
infinity of worlds that we inhabit, which enables the contestation and transformation of their 
 
orders.2 
 
 
Yet, is this all there is to the politics of the World? Does it have any content beyond the 
affirmation of the contingency of every positive world that leaves political prescription up to 
these worlds themselves, ending up with a radical pluralism that grants no ontological 
privilege to any particular world and is thus incapable of adjudicating between the politics 
within different worlds? It is clear that the politics of the World cannot affirm any principle 
or value that would derive from the positive order of a world, be it tradition or law, identity 
or culture. No particular being or realm of beings could be the source of such principles, 
whose only ground must be being itself. Yet, being itself is precisely the void, in which 
worlds appear for Heidegger and from which they are woven for Badiou. What political 
prescription could possibly follow from Nothing? 
 
Two answers to this question immediately spring to mind. Firstly, insofar as the World is void, it 
prescribes nothing, i.e. there is no such thing as a politics of the World beyond the coexistence of 
intra-worldly political orders. Secondly, insofar as the world is void, it may prescribe anything, 
by analogy with the principle of ex falso quodlibet: anything at all follows from nothing. 
Whatever politics is practiced in a particular world, it is ‘founded’ by the void to an equal degree 
to any other politics. Either way, no positive political principle may be inferred from the World, 
which is merely an indifferent vacuum, in which an infinite number of contingent worlds coexist. 
If all the ontology of the World as void could politically prescribe were either nothing or 
anything, we would be stuck in nihilism, either a ‘passive nihilism’ of a weary particularism 
resigned to the ways of one’s world or an ‘active nihilism’ 
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of a rampant particularism that arbitrarily posits its own prescriptions (cf. Nietzsche, 1968: 
 
16-18). 
 
 
Nonetheless, there is a third possibility of a genuinely universal political prescription that 
follows precisely from the affirmation of contingency. For the contingency of a positive 
world to become manifest, the World as void must first come to appearance within this world, 
i.e. be disclosed to a worldly being. As we have argued, this disclosure of the World takes 
place in an attunement that Heidegger refers to as ‘standing out in the nothing’. This 
condition is attained when we subtract ourselves from the positive transcendental order of our 
world, ending up ‘left empty’ and ‘held in limbo’ due to the suspension of both our own 
intra-worldly identities and our relations with other beings of the world. As a result of this 
subtraction, the transcendental of the world, which is nothing but the relational network that 
regulates the appearance of beings, is rendered inoperative and, as it were, comes undone. 
 
Yet, this suspension of the transcendental does not entail the disappearance or dissolution of 
the beings of the world, but only that they now appear solely in their being, as a pure 
inconsistent multiplicity devoid of positive identity or relational order (Badiou, 2005: 25). 
We shall term this zero degree of appearance ‘being-in-the-World’, in contrast to Heidegger’s 
positive and relational ‘being-in-the-world’. Giorgio Agamben (1993: 1-3, 96) has famously 
termed this mode of appearance ‘whatever being’ or ‘being-thus’: being that is solely its 
manner of being, subtracted from all identitarian predicates and wholly exposed in its 
facticity. In other words, in their subtraction from the transcendental of the world ‘whatever 
beings’ undergo neither a deprivation (of the old identity) nor a transformation (into a new 
one), but solely the exposure of the fact that they are in the absence of any identification of 
what they are. 
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Thus, the disclosure of the World within positive worlds also transforms the beings to whom 
it is disclosed, reducing their positive and transcendentally regulated being-in-the-world to 
the subtractive mode of being-in-the-World, in which all that appears is being itself. 
Evidently, if there were to exist a politics of the World that would go beyond the affirmation 
of the pluralism of worlds but whose maxims would be irreducible to positive intra-worldly 
principles, this austere condition could be its sole possible foundation. While the World as 
void cannot be the source of political maxims, they may nonetheless be derived from being-
in-the-World as the attunement that we as worldly beings must enter for the World to be 
disclosed in the first place. 
 
While this derivation is beyond the scope of this article, let us merely illuminate its logic by 
considering such familiar political principles as freedom, equality and community. These 
maxims have historically served as positive intra-worldly principles governing particular, e.g. 
liberal, socialist or nationalist worlds. Moreover, all three of them have been deployed 
tendentiously and hypocritically in hegemonic and often violent attempts to universalize 
these particular worlds. There is certainly no shortage of critical studies exposing the way the 
alleged universality of these principles was used to legitimize particularistic, inegalitarian and 
exclusionary forms of politics. And yet, the concepts of freedom, equality and community 
have also been reinterpreted in contemporary continental thought on the basis of the 
affirmation of pure being devoid of any positive identitarian predicates (see respectively 
Nancy 1994, Ranciere 1999, Agamben 1993). 
 
Grasped as the attributes of being-in-the-World, freedom, equality and community are no 
longer reducible to ideologies, values or norms of a particular origin, Western or otherwise, 
but rather describe the condition attained by the withdrawal from any intra-worldly norm. 
The mode of their functioning is thus strictly axiomatic, devoid of any intra-worldly 
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foundation and referring to that which remains when worldly beings are subtracted from all 
such foundations and are exposed in the pure facticity of their being. From this perspective, 
these axioms are simultaneously transcendent and immanent in relation to the worlds in 
which they are affirmed. Insofar as they are derived from the subtraction from every intra-
worldly determination, they are by definition transcendent in relation to all worlds. Yet, since 
the void of the World is the universal part of every world, these axioms are also immanent to 
every world in which they are advanced. In Jean-Luc Nancy’s formulation, they are 
transimmanent, transcending the positivity of the world not from above or beyond but from 
within (Nancy, 1998: 55). 
 
It is thus possible to conceive of the politics of the World that goes beyond the mere 
affirmation of the contingency of all worlds towards the transformation of these worlds on 
the basis of the axioms arising from being-in-the-World as the condition, in which the void of 
the World is disclosed. This transformation consists in the production within worlds of the 
positive effects of these axioms, i.e. the overcoming and neutralization of intra-worldly 
hierarchies, exclusions and restrictions that have no ontological correlate in the name of 
 
freedom, equality and community of all beings as whatever beings.3 Thus, the axioms of 
being-in-the-World give concrete content to a universalist world politics that is no longer 
suspended between passive and active nihilism, between ‘nothing works’ and ‘anything goes’ 
but rather strives to enhance freedom, equality and community in an infinity of infinite 
worlds where it is practiced. 
 
While these axioms are valid for all worlds, the task of world politics does not consist in the 
aggregation of the infinity of worlds into an ‘over-world’ constituted on their basis. However 
‘global’ in its scope, such an overworld could never contain all worlds and would thus remain 
a particular world among others, devoid of any ontological privilege over more ‘local’ 
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worlds. Yet, neither can such a privilege be granted to the plurality of local worlds, since the 
contingency of worlds does not depend on their size or any other immanent characteristic. 
Thus, integration and fragmentation are equally legitimate pathways for world politics, which 
has no privileged site, level or method but is defined solely by its content, the universal 
axioms derived from being-in-the-World. World politics does not derive its name from the 
fact that it unites all worlds into the whole but from the fact that it affirms the same axioms 
arising from the disclosure of the void of the World in whatever world it is practiced. 
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 NOTES 
 
 
 
1 See Abizadeh 2005, Albert, Cederman and Wendt 2010, Wendt 2003, Cerny 2010, Pin-Fat 
2009, Beardsworth 2011 for diverse attempts to reconceptualise universality in world politics. 
See also Prozorov 2009, 2011 for a critical discussion of the prevalent understanding of the 
universal in IR theory as split between the particularistic pluralism of the international and 
the hegemonic totality of the world state, and the outline of the alternative approach that I 
term ‘generic universalism’. 
 
2 This affirmation of contingency of worlds is given a more radical interpretation in the work 
of Quentin Meillassoux, whose ontology dispenses with Leibnitz’s principle of sufficient 
reason and asserts the absolute contingency of all that is as the sole necessity (Meillassoux, 
2008: 65-81). Drawing on Cantor’s theorem discussed above, Meillassoux proceeds to make 
this radical contingency or ‘hyper-chaos’ compatible with the empirical stability of worlds: 
insofar as there is no Whole, the application of probabilistic reasoning, which presupposes 
the totality of all possible outcomes, is no longer legitimate. It is thus possible to conceive of 
a world that exists for no reason whatsoever yet remains remarkably stable. With regard to 
politics, this approach tempers the optimism usually associated with the affirmation of 
contingency: the fact that the order of a given world is not necessary only means that its 
transformation is always possible and tells us nothing about its likelihood. Meillassoux’s own 
ethico-political stance, in which the eschatological awaiting of the (as yet) inexistent God is 
combined with a ‘finite’ politics aware of its limits (Meillassoux, 2011: 162-163), testifies to 
the political ambivalence of the idea of contingency. 
 
3 This approach resonates with Badiou’s understanding of politics as a ‘generic’ truth 
procedure that produces within worlds the positive consequences of the eruption of the event, 
which is defined in set-theoretical terms as a self-belonging set, whose belonging to the world 
is undecidable and which exposes the world’s ontological inconsistency, convoking the void 
within it. The intervention that declares the occurrence of the event and the continuous 
fidelity to it in the form of the production of its effects (‘truths’) constitute the subject of 
politics as a finite fragment of its procedure. Thus, in our terms the political subject is a 
worldly being that produces positive effects of the event of the World within its world, 
transforming it in accordance with the axioms of being-in-the-World. See Badiou 2005: 335-
353, 391-405; 2008a: 147-175. For a more detailed reading of Badiou in the context of world 
politics see Prozorov 2009. The key difference of our approach to world politics is that while 
for Badiou the content of the political ‘truth’ is limited to the axiom of equality, we also 
include into this list freedom and community, which Badiou all too quickly downgrades to 
the status of intra-worldly ordering principles (Badiou, 2008a: 171-173). Thus, in contrast to 
Badiou’s affirmation of egalitarianism as the only ‘true politics’, we suggest that there is in 
fact a plurality of modes of politics, defined by what axiom of being-in-the-World (or a 
combination thereof) they affirm. 
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